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JUSTICE DOUGLAS' CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW
During his thirty-five years of service on the Supreme Court of the
United States, Justice Douglas has had an opportunity to write opinions on
an extraordinary variety of subjects embracing virtually every area of the
law. His views in some areas have directed the law's course of development.
And even where the Court majority has pursued a different path, Justice
Douglas has forcefully left his mark in a multitude of separate opinions. In
four short articles below, based on addresses delivered in Washington, D.C.,
this fall at a Convocation honoring Justice Douglas for his record tenure
on the Supreme Court, Professors Emerson, Dorsen, Ares, and Countryman
discuss some of the Justice's most important contributions in the areas of,
respectively, the first amendment, equal protection of the laws, constitutional
criminal law, and business regulation.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
THOMAS I. EMERSON*
Many of Justice Douglas' contributions to first amendment law are well
known and, while often criticized, are widely appreciated.' As did Justice
Brandeis, he starts from broad philosophical premises that envision the first
amendment as the keystone of an open democratic society. He looks upon
the specific guarantees of the first amendment-freedom of speech, press,
assembly and petition 2-as but concrete examples of the more fundamental
right to full freedom of expression in all its manifestations. And he has never
been reluctant to interpret the first amendment in ways which make its great
underlying principles meaningful in the light of contemporary events.
Justice Douglas' views, in terms of specific first amendment doctrine,
have also been the subject of extensive comment. Like other liberals of his
time, he initially endorsed the clear and present danger test as the measure of
the government's right to restrict expression. In his dissent in Dennis v.
United States,3 the first Smith Act prosecution to reach the Supreme Court,
he even assembled detailed factual data to show that the teachings and writings
of the American Communist Party did not in any way threaten overthrow of
the government. Shortly after that decision Justice Douglas, following Justice
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Black, moved to the so-called "absolutist" position. His view was, and still is,
that any conduct that constitutes expression and is not so "closely brigaded
with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it[,] " 4 is entitled to full
protection against government prohibition or regulation. Moreover, unlike
Justice Black, Justice Douglas took a broad view of what constitutes "expres-
sion." The Black-Douglas position has been vigorously denounced as totally
unworkable. Nevertheless, assuming one adopts a common sense, functional
definition of expression, the full-protection test is not only wholly viable but
also better able to effectuate the purposes of the first amendment than any
other doctrine yet devised.
It is unnecessary to comment here in detail upon Justice Douglas' fired-
up commitment to the principles of the first amendment, his boundless energy
in defending that constitutional guarantee in the Supreme Court, and his
immense courage in holding to his position without compromising his views
to fit the current pressures. All these characteristics of his work are likewise
known and appreciated.
There are two aspects of Justice Douglas' contribution to the first amend-
ment, however, that have received less attention than those just mentioned.
The first of these is his remarkable ability to grasp the realities of the system
of freedom of expression and to formulate legal doctrine which takes those
realities into account.
Most constitutional principles have a tendency to lose their vitality on the
long journey from the Supreme Court to the streets, to the police station, to
the prosecutor's office, and to the local courts. The rules are handed down
from on high, in broad and abstract phrases. There is often a failure of com-
munication, however, somewhere between the source and the human beings
at the site of application. Moreover, there is an inevitable proclivity in local
power structures to ignore, to evade, or to pay lip service only. An institution
such as the Supreme Court must engage in a never-ending struggle both to
formulate workable rules and to keep a constant counter-pressure upon those
who respond by inaction or evasion. The great capacity of the Warren Court
to function on. this level was one of its principal glories. These efforts have
been frequently denounced as "activism" but, in fact, they are essential to
transform constitutional principles into effective working rules for everyday
life.
Justice Douglas, together with Justice Black, was in the forefront of this
movement on the Warren Court and still continues his fight for the reality
principle. Nowhere has this approach been more important than in the first
amendment area. Justice Douglas has not only grasped the theory of the first
amendment; he has also understood the apparatus of repression and sought to
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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attack it at every point. There are countless examples in Justice Douglas'
opinions, but two extracts will suffice.
Dissenting in Adler v. Board of Education5 in 1952, for example, Justice
Douglas perceived the pernicious effects of loyalty oaths for teachers and
classroom discussion:
What happens under this law is typical of what happens in a
police state. Teachers are under constant surveillance; their pasts are
combed for signs of disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues
to dangerous thoughts. A pall is cast over the classrooms. There can
be no real academic freedom in that environment .... A problem can
no longer be pursued with impunity to its edges. Fear stalks the
classroom. The teacher is no longer a stimulant to adventurous
thinking; she becomes instead a pipe line for safe and sound infor-
mation. A deadening dogma takes the place of free inquiry. Instruc-
tion tends to become sterile; pursuit of knowledge is discouraged;
discussion often leaves off where it should begin.0
Or take note of his description in 1972 of the current encroachments on our
liberties, as he concurred in the Court's decision that the executive branch
could not conduct national security wiretaps without regard to normal consti-
tutional protection. This opinion, it should be remembered, was written before
the disclosures of Watergate:
[W]e are currently in the throes of another national seizure of para-
noia, resembling the hysteria which surrounded the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, the Palmer Raids, and the McCarthy era. Those who
register dissent or who petition their governments for redress are
subjected to scrutiny by grand juries, by the FBI, or even by the
military. Their associates are interrogated. Their homes are bugged
and their telephones are wiretapped. They are befriended by secret
government informers. Their patriotism and loyalty are questioned....
When the Executive attempts to excuse these tactics as essen-
tial to its defense against internal subversion, we are obliged to
remind it, without apology, of this Court's long commitment to the
preservation of the Bill of Rights from the corrosive environment of
precisely such expedients. 7
To some critics, Justice Douglas' sense of reality has seemed overwrought;
they have argued that he has overstated the facts and overemphasized the
threat to first amendment freedoms. But history has surely vindicated him.
To the extent that our system of freedom of expression shdws vitality, we owe
a great debt to the clear vision and insistent realism of Justice Douglas'
opinions.
The second feature of Justice Douglas' analysis in the first amendment
field that has not been widely recognized is his emphasis upon the amend-
5. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
6. Id. at 510.
7. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 329-32 (1972) (foot-
notes omitted).
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ment's personal fulfillment aspects. This development stems ultimately, I
believe, from Justice Douglas' comprehension of the way in which our society
tends to succumb to its own institutions and vested interests. He has observed
how we seem to be losing the capacity to direct our own lives according to
rational plan, and how we appear overwhelmed by a managerial structure that
is taking us toward disaster according to its own bureaucratic laws rather
than being guided by human choice. Justice Douglas has responded sympa-
thetically to those forces in American life that have sought to resist these
trends. Thus, he has understood the deeper significance of the civil rights
movement, the black revolution, the organizers for peace and, above all, the
youth culture. He sees these social phenomena as legitimate strivings toward
a more open, more fraternal, more rational, and more self-fulfilled society.
And he has sought to transform the basic principles of constitutional law in
order to protect and foster these new values against society's effort to suppress
them.
All this is reflected in Justice Douglas' view of the first amendment. He
sees the first amendment as much more than a weapon to prevent the govern-
ment from interfering with freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition in
narrow terms. He views it not only in Mill's sense as performing a social
function in maintaining a marketplace of ideas,8 or in Meiklejohn's sense as
essential to the working of the democratic process,9 but also as supplying the
constitutional grounds for protecting each person in seeking to realize his or
her individual potential as a man or woman. He would, through the first
amendment, guarantee to each person freedom of the mind, freedom of con-
science, freedom of lifestyle, and freedom to expand, grow and be oneself. He
is utilizing the first amendment as a counter to all the pressures of modern
life toward conformity, bureaucracy and a purely plastic existence. In this
respect, Justice Douglas has given a totally new dimension to the first amend-
ment.
One of the earliest statements of these views appears in Justice Douglas'
dissenting opinion in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,10 arguing in 1952
for a right of privacy:
Freedom of religion and freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment give more than the privilege to worship, to write, to
speak as one chooses; they give freedom not to do nor to act as the
government chooses. The First Amendment in its respect for the
conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief.
To think as one chooses and to believe what one wishes are impor-
tant aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.1
8. See J. MILL, ON LiBERTY (1859).
9. See A. MEIKLEjOHN, PoLiTICAL ]FREEDOM (1948).
10. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
11. Id. at 467-68.
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